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Abstract  -  Traditional  intrusion  detection  systems 
(IDSs)  focus  on  low-level  attacks  or  anomalies,  and 
raise alerts independently, though there may be logical 
connections  between  them.  In  situations  where  there 
are  intensive  attacks,  not  only  will  actual  alerts  be 
mixed with false alerts, but the amount of alerts will 
also become unmanageable. As a result, it is diﬃcult 
for  human  users  or  intrusion  response  systems  to 
understand  the  alerts  and  take  appropriate  actions. 
There  are  several  approaches  for  intrusion  detection 
but none of them is fully satisfactory. They generally 
generate too many false positives and the alerts are too 
elementary  and  not  enough  accurate  to  be  directly 
managed  by  a  security  administrator.  This  paper 
describes  an  aggregation  and  correlation  algorithm 
used  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  intrusion 
detection. 
 
Keywords - Intrusion detection, alert aggregation, alert 
correlation. 
 
1. Introduction  
Intrusion  detection  has  been  studied  for  more  than 
twenty  years  since  Anderson’s  report  [1].  Intrusion 
detection  techniques  can  be  roughly  classiﬁed  as 
anomaly  detection  and  misuse  detection.  Anomaly 
detection  (e.g.,  NIDES/STAT  [2])  is  based  on  the 
normal behavior of a subject (e.g., a user or a system); 
any action that signiﬁcantly deviates from the normal 
behavior is considered intrusive. Misuse detection (e.g., 
NetSTAT [Vigna and Kemmerer 1999]) detects attacks 
based on the characteristics of known attacks or system 
vulnerabilities; any action that conforms to the pattern 
of  a  known  attack  or  vulnerability  is  considered 
intrusive.  Traditional  intrusion  detection  systems 
(IDSs)  focus  on  low-level  attacks  or  anomalies,  and 
raise alerts independently, though there may be logical 
connections between them.  
 
In situations where there are intensive attacks, not only 
will  actual  alerts  be  mixed  with  false  alerts,  but  the 
amount of alerts will also become unmanageable. As a 
result,  it  is  diﬃcult  for  human  users  or  intrusion 
response  systems  to  understand  the  alerts  and  take 
appropriate  actions.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to 
develop techniques to construct attack scenarios (i.e., 
steps that attackers use in their attacks) from alerts to 
facilitate  intrusion  analysis.  Many  head  network 
administrators put their trust in firewalls to maintain a 
secure environment, which can fall unfortunately short. 
Some rely on the system administrator’s ability to lock 
those  servers  that  are  essential.  Others  choose  to 
predefine security policies and procedures, but ignore 
the  gaps  left  by  evolving  technologies.  Few  security 
agents  have  the  insight  to  associate  security  policies 
with  technology-based  security  solutions.  For  most 
enterprises and organizations, a combination of  these 
approaches can address a fairly comprehensive set of 
vulnerabilities. However, they still miss some facets of 
network security such as event correlation and secure 
audit  trails  for  forensic  analysis.  This  is  where 
intrusion-detection systems (IDS) show their value [3]. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 
2  describes  generic  and  scalable  intrusion-detection 
architecture  and  introduces  the  concept  of  an 
aggregation and correlation component (ACC) that can 
analyze and correlate the alerts generated by intrusion-
detection probes attached to it. In Section 3, we list the 
conceptual and operational requirements this ACC has 
to fulfill. Section 4 describes our architecture for alert 
processing as well as the unified alert data model we 
use.  In  Section  5,  we  discuss  the  aggregation  and 
correlation algorithm that we have implemented in our 
prototype system. 
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In the current state of  intrusion-detection technology, 
we  wish  to  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of 
components,  the  probes  and  the  aggregation  and 
correlation  components  (ACCs).  What  we  call 
intrusion-detection  probes  in  this  context  are  usually 
referred  to  as  intrusion-detection  systems  available 
either as commercial products or in the public domain. 
The purpose of the ACC is to correlate the output of 
several probes and give the operator a condensed view 
of  the  reported  security  issues.  The  relationship 
between probes and ACCs is shown in Figure 1. As one 
can  see,  the  architecture  is  a  distributed  set  of 
components, hierarchically layered to enable scalability 
of the whole system. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overall intrusion-detection architecture. 
 
We have implemented a prototype of an ACC that is 
based on the Tivoli Enterprise Console (TEC) [4, 7]. 
The TEC is the event-handling product of IBM/Tivoli 
Systems.  Based  on  our  technology,  there  is  also  a 
product  available  now,  the  Tivoli  SecureWay  Risk 
Manager [5, 6]. 
 
2.1 Aggregation and Correlation  
      Components (ACCs) 
 
Each ACC receives alerts from probes and other ACCs. 
Alerts are sent in a standard format and do not need to 
be altered. Once an alert has been received, two sets of 
tasks are carried out, one to analyze the received alert 
in  the  context  of  the  ACC  (comprising  the  alerts 
received earlier and configuration information) and one 
to provide output to the local operator, if any. The first 
set  of  tasks  is  covered  by  the  aggregation  and 
correlation  algorithm  described  in  Section  5.  The 
second set of tasks allows an operator to interact with 
the ACC regardless of where this component is located 
in  the  tree.  This  feature  accommodates  the  fact  that 
organizations  have  multiple  reporting  levels;  in  our 
architecture,  each  department  deploying  the  probes 
would have at least one ACC as well, which would be  
 
used  for  local  reporting  and  for  feeding  higher  level 
ACCs corresponding to higher levels of the hierarchy. 
 
3. Requirements 
 
When  we  started this  project,  we  had  two  groups  of 
requirements.  Conceptual  requirements  focus  on  the 
service  that  the  ACC  provides  to  the  operator, 
independently  of  any  implementation  considerations. 
Operational requirements describe additional issues that 
are  important  but  for  which  we  are  not  yet  able  to 
provide a generic solution, or issues that are handled on 
an ad hoc basis. 
 
Flooding One of the most apparent characteristics of 
intrusion-detection systems is that they tend to generate 
numerous alerts. An operator can be flooded with alerts 
very easily, and the usual reaction is to reduce the flux 
by  restricting  or  even  turning  off  a  large  part of  the 
signatures that can be searched. 
 
Context An attack is very likely to manifest itself in 
multiple alerts spread over a period of time. A skilled 
attacker will first probe to evaluate its target and then 
start penetrating, the entire activity  being sufficiently 
widely spread to go barely noticed. 
 
False  alerts  As  experience  shows,  probes  tend  to 
generate  false  alerts  that  are  directly  related  to  the 
particularities of the information system in which they 
are  deployed.  Given  that  developers  of  intrusion-
detection  systems {by trying to avoid  false negatives 
{accept  a  certain  number  of  false  positives,  this  is  a 
frequent  issue  in  today's  systems.  Inaccuracy  of  the 
alerts in the correlation component is considered in two 
forms: 
1. Intrinsic inaccuracy of the alert owing to the probe's 
detection code being poorly  written such that  it does 
not  discriminate  well  between  normal  and  malicious 
activity for this particular attack. 
2.  Relative  inaccuracy  of  the  alert  owing  to  the 
information  system  being  monitored  exhibiting 
characteristics similar to those of malicious activities. 
 
Scalability  Given  the  number  of  alerts  generated  by 
current  intrusion-detection  probes,  scalability  rapidly 
becomes an issue. When deploying a larger number of 
probes, operators are forced to reduce the number of 
vulnerabilities monitored to limit the number of alerts 
to a reasonable level. 
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These  requirements  focus  on  the  interaction  of  the 
entire  intrusion-detection  system  (probes  and  ACCs) 
with the management platform. As such, the intrusion 
detection system must integrate with the management 
platform,  and  ensure  an  easy  configuration  and  a 
certain level of performance. 
 
Integration  We  believe  that  in  its  current  state, 
intrusion-detection  systems  impose  an  additional 
burden on operators to deploy, configure and maintain. 
Integration  into  an  existing  framework  will  give 
operators a familiar  look-and-feel, and allow them to 
use  intrusion  detection  like  any  other  application  in 
their realm. 
 
Our  prototype  is  implemented  on  top  of  the  Tivoli 
Enterprise  Console  (TEC),  a  commercial  event-
handling  product.  It  takes  advantage  of  the  existing 
facilities for event acquisition, storage in a database and 
display. The  ACC  is  implemented as a set of prolog 
rules for the prolog engine that sits inside the TEC and 
processes events. 
 
Configurability  The  ACC  must  allow  an  easy 
reconfiguration  of  the  reasoning  parameters  (i.e. 
severity,  confidence,  specific  known-bad  or  known-
good  hosts).  This  should  alleviate  but  not  solve  the 
false-alert problem, as operators observing false alerts 
could  reduce  the  trust  or  level  of  the  corresponding 
alerts, so that their weight in the correlation process is 
lowered  accordingly.  In  our  prototype,  configuration 
remains manual, by means of configuration files. 
 
Performance Network management environments are 
often capable of handling hundreds of alerts per second. 
However,  given  the  complexity  of  the  processing 
required  achieving  meaningful  correlation  and  the 
diversity  of  information  contained  in  the  alerts,  it  is 
difficult for an ACC to achieve the same performance. 
Therefore,  ACCs  have  to  be  carefully  designed  and 
implemented so that they offer optimal performance. 
 
Our ACC is developed with the target of handling one 
alert  per  second.  This  corresponds  to  the  maximum 
alert rate we observe in the environment for which our 
prototype was built. 
 
4. Representations of Alerts 
The first task we faced when developing the ACC was 
to develop a unified framework for intrusion-detection 
alerts that would allow us to process them regardless of 
their  origin.  This  led  to  the  definition  of  a  system 
architecture to gather alerts and the definition of a data 
model in the form of a class hierarchy. 
 
4.1 System Architecture 
 
The ACC acquires alerts  from the  intrusion-detection 
probes as shown in Figure 2. We distinguish between 
two kinds of probes, Tivoli-aware and not. 
 
 
Fig. 2. System architecture for the ACC. 
 
A Tivoli-aware probe can send events directly to the 
Tivoli  Enterprise  Console  (TEC);  our  architecture  in 
this case assumes that the probe also knows the data 
model and the appropriate format for events. 
 
A  non-Tivoli-aware  probe  requires  an  additional 
interface  component  to  realize  the  transformation  of 
native events into our data model. This probe-specific 
interface component is called a pre-adapter. It runs on 
the probe and knows how to read alert information in 
real time (or as close to it as possible). It formats the 
alert according to the alert class hierarchy described in 
Section 4.2. It then ships this formatted alert using the 
Tivoli Framework communication facility to the TEC 
where  the  ACC  is  implemented.  Currently,  the  pre-
adapter  has  no  additional  function.  However,  if 
performance becomes an issue, we envisage giving it 
more  functionality,  such as providing alert counts, to 
reduce the workload of the ACC. 
 
4.2 Alert Class Hierarchy 
 
One  of  the  main  challenges  of  this  work  was  the 
creation of a unified data model for acquiring intrusion-
detection alerts. This data model is vital to the project 
for  two  reasons:  ensuring  independence  between  the 
correlation  algorithms  and  the  actual  alerts  generated 
by the probes, and ensuring that any probe can easily be 
integrated into the system and benefit from the generic 
correlation  rules.  The  data  model  deployed  in  our 
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on a standard message-exchange format. There are two 
kinds of classes. Abstract classes represent generic alert 
concepts  that  can  be  used  by  all  intrusion-detection 
probes.  Implementation  classes  inherit  from  abstract 
classes and carry specific alerts generated by a specific 
probe. 
 
5. The Aggregation and Correlation (AC) 
Algorithm 
 
The goal of the aggregation and correlation algorithm is 
to form groups of alerts by creating a small number of 
relationships that are exposed to the operator, instead of 
exposing the raw alerts. 
 
5.1 Preprocessing of Alerts 
 
Preprocessing  is  needed  to  unify  the  information 
available in an alert and provides some error checking 
to verify that the alert does not contain information that 
is  obviously  wrong,  e.g.  an  invalid  time  stamp,  and 
would prevent the correlation algorithm from working 
correctly. Probes  identify the source and target of an 
attack  in  different  ways.  In  particular,  network-based 
systems  are  very  likely  to  provide  IP  addresses, 
whereas  host-based systems will provide  host names. 
To ensure unique identification of these actors, each is 
assigned  a  token.  The  preprocessing  translates  the 
information  available  in  the  alert  into  three  tokens: 
probe, source and target. This translation process does 
not use external information acquisition, such as DNS 
queries, because of the  latency  involved  in retrieving 
the information, but relies on information available in 
configuration files. 
 
5.2 The Correlation Relationship: Duplicates and 
Consequences 
 
This part of the AC algorithm deals with alerts that are 
logically  linked  with  each  other.  The  reasoning  is 
separated into two parts. First, a backward-looking part 
determines whether an alert represents a cause that has 
already been taken into account by the AC algorithm, 
e.g. is a duplicate alert. Then, a forward looking part 
determines whether the current alert must be followed 
by others, and in which condition this linkage occurs, 
e.g. whether consequence alerts have to be expected. 
 
5.3 The Aggregation Relationship: Situations 
 
In  many  cases,  isolated  events  are  not  considered 
significant.  Therefore,  intrusion-detection  alerts  are 
aggregated into so called situations". A situation is a set 
of alerts that have certain characteristics  in common. 
Each  intrusion-detection  event  contains  information 
that  can  act  as  an  aggregation  axis.  Our  current 
prototype  recognizes  three  aggregation  axes,  namely 
the source, the target, and the class of the attack. 
 
The situation definition consists of the following terms: 
Alert class The first term is the class of the alert or a 
wildcard. A wildcard indicates that the alert class is not 
used as an aggregation axis.  
Source token The second term is the attack source or a 
wildcard.  
Target token The third term is the target of the attack 
or a wildcard. 
Severity  level  The  fourth  term  is  a  threshold.  If  the 
aggregated severity of the situation alerts exceeds this 
threshold, an alarm is generated. 
Since  wildcards are allowed, different situation  types 
are  possible.  By  systematically  evaluating  all 
combinations of aggregation axes and leaving out the 
case where a wildcard is given for source, target, and 
alert class, we end up with seven different situations as 
follows: 
Situation  1  Alerts  with  the  same  source,  the  same 
target  and  belonging  to  the  same  alert  class  are 
aggregated in Situation 1. This allows one to detect, for 
example, an attacker who is launching a series of Web 
server attacks against a single Web server. 
 
Situation  2-1  Alerts  with  the  same  source  and 
destination are aggregated. This situation is intended to 
detect, for example, an attacker who runs a series of 
attacks  against  the  various  services  available  on  the 
target machine. 
 
Situation  2-2  Alerts  with  the  same  target  and 
belonging to the same alert class are aggregated. This 
situation  can  be  used  to  detect  a  distributed  attack 
against a single target. 
 
Situation  2-3  Alerts  with  the  same  source  and 
belonging to the same alert class are aggregated. This 
situation allows one, for example, to find an attacker 
who is running a series of name server attacks against a 
set of name servers. 
 
Situation  3-1  Alerts  with  the  same  source  are 
aggregated. The goal is to detect a single attacker who 
runs various attacks against different targets. 
Situation  3-2  Alerts  with  the  same  target  are 
aggregated.  This  allows  one  to  detect  distributed 
attacks. 
Situation 3-3 Alerts belonging to the same attack class 
are  aggregated.  This  situation  is  triggered  if,  for 
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attack that was recently posted to a hacker mailing list. 
 
More  specific  situation  alarms  have  precedence  over 
less  specific  situation  alarms.  For  example,  if  we 
assume that the thresholds for all situations are set to 
the  same  value  and  situation  1  is  triggered,  only  an 
alarm for situation 1 but not for situations 2 and 3 is 
generated. For situation 2, a list of the values specified 
in the wildcard field is maintained. We refer to it as an 
alert property  list. For example,  for situation 2-1 the 
alert property list is the list of all attacked hosts. In the 
case  of  situation  3,  two  alert  property  lists  are 
maintained. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have shown the need for an 
aggregation and correlation component (ACC) that can 
handle alerts generated by  intrusion-detection probes. 
We have discussed the requirements such an ACC has 
to fulfill and have derived system architecture to gather 
and process alerts in a central place. 
 
The ACC comprises two main parts: a unified 
data model  for intrusion detection alerts and a set of 
rules to process the alerts. The AC algorithm can detect 
duplicates,  i.e.,  alerts  that  are  reported  by  different 
probes  but are related to the same attack, as well as 
consequences,  i.e.,  alerts  that  are  related  and  should 
occur  together.  We  have  introduced  the  concept  of 
situations that allows us to aggregate similar alerts and 
thus provide the operator with a more condensed view 
of  the  security  issues  to  be  addressed.  Alerts  are 
aggregated into situations based on any combination of 
the three attributes source, target and alert class. Our 
ACC  is  built  on  the  Tivoli  Enterprise  Console.  The 
integration  into  an  existing  event  management 
framework had the advantage that we could concentrate 
on the correlation aspects of our work. Furthermore, the 
operator is provided with a familiar user interface. 
 
References 
 
[1]  Anderson,  J.  P.  1980.  Computer  security  threat 
monitoring  and  surveillance.  Tech.  rep.,  James  P. 
Anderson Co., Fort Washington, PA. 
 
[2]  Javits,  H.  and  Valdes,  A.  1993.  The  NIDES 
statistical  component:  Description  and  justiﬁcation. 
Tech.  rep.,  SRI  International,  Computer  Science 
Laboratory. 
[3] R. Bace. Intrusion Detection. McMillan Technical 
Publishing, 2000. 
[4] IBM International Technical Support Organization. 
Early Experiences with Tivoli Enterprise Console 3.7, 
November 2000. IBM Redbook SG24-6015-00. 
 
[5] IBM International Technical Support Organization. 
Tivoli SecureWay Risk Manager:Correlating Enterprise 
Risk  Management,  November  2000.  IBM  Redbook 
SG24-6021-00. 
 
[6] Tivoli Systems. Tivoli SecureWay Risk Manager, 
User's Guide, Version 3.7, De-cember 2000. 
 
[7] Tivoli Systems. TME 10 Enterprise Console, User's 
Guide, Version 3.7, November 2000. 
 
 
 
 
AUTHORS PROFILE 
 
 
Kunchakarra  Anusha,  Pursuing 
M.Tech(CS)  from  Nalanda 
Institute  of  Engineering  & 
Technology,Siddharth  Nagar, 
Sattenapalli,  Guntur  Affiliated  to 
JNTUK, Kakinada, A.P., India. My 
research  Interests  are  computer 
networks, Data Mining. 
 
 
K.V.D  Sagar,  working  as  
Asst.Professor,  Department  of 
Computer  Science  Engineering  at 
Nalanda Institute of Engineering & 
Technology,Siddharth  Nagar, 
Sattenapalli,  Guntur  Affiliated  to 
JNTUK, Kakinada, A.P., India. My 
research  Interests  are  Mobile  Computing,  Network 
Security and Mobile Networks. He is a Life member of 
MISTE. 
 
 
 
Kunchakarra Anusha et al ,Int.J.Computer Technology & Applications,Vol 3 (1), 411-415
IJCTA | JAN-FEB 2012 
Available online@www.ijcta.com
415
ISSN:2229-6093